The interview feels real. The repo is malware.

Fake job interviews are all over my feed. Picture this: a recruiter reaches out on LinkedIn. The interview feels real, camera on, good questions. Then they ask you to clone a demo repo and run it locally. That last step can put coding assessment malware on your laptop. Verify the recruiter first. If it has to run, use a throwaway VM.

I hope nobody here has been through it.

What one fake take-home did

One fake take-home reported to OpenSSF in October 2026 had no install scripts, so --ignore-scripts wouldn’t save you. The malicious code ran from the Tailwind config the moment you started the dev server.

The record names a fake company, Nodveta, and a “backend engineer assessment”. The job was posted on a job site, Torre.ai. A listing didn’t make it legitimate.

It also came with an AGENTS.md and a CLAUDE.md. Instructions for the AI you’d ask to check the repo. They send it to read docs inside node_modules, which means installing the dependencies first. The report doesn’t show an agent obeying. But someone wrote those files for one.

Yunus Aydın took apart an earlier package in this chain. Its private package contacts a server the attacker controls. Then it runs the code it receives, with full Node.js access. That means your files and your commands.

An October 19, 2026 report counted 26 npm packages built the same way, published between July 28 and October 9. That’s a dated count, not a live total.

OpenSSF’s contributors and Aydın documented these cases.

What the scam looks like before you run anything

A convincing interview doesn’t clear the repo. Aydın’s had standard backend questions. These warning signs come from the reports above and a September 2024 FBI notice. That notice concerns North Korean attacks on the crypto industry.

What you notice	Where it showed up
They agree too fast	Aydın countered 50% above the offer. The answer: “We can accommodate your compensation.” The FBI lists “unrealistically high compensation without negotiation.”
Little evidence outside its own site	Aydın found no funding news, press or LinkedIn company page with real employees for Worklo.
Their own links lead nowhere	Aydın reported a broken GitHub link and a failed sign-up on Worklo’s site.
The dates don’t add up	Nodveta’s commits were dated September 20 and 21, 2026. Its GitHub organisation was created on September 29.
A login token sits in the repo	Both repos committed a .npmrc file with an npm token. It unlocks a private package that public scanners can’t read.
The test means running their code	The FBI lists a “pre-employment test” or debugging exercise that runs unknown packages, scripts or GitHub repositories. It also lists a script to “enable call or video” supposedly blocked by your location.

None of these proves a scam alone. A real startup can have a broken sign-up page. A repo moved to a new organisation can have old commits. When several line up, stop.

Three things that feel safe

Skipping install scripts. This one ran later, when the dev server started.

A scan. The October 7 record says npm audit and public scanners can’t see the private package. The October 19 record says that package “was not retrieved”. An automated note there calls the public part “consistent with a small Tailwind CSS animation utility package”. If a repo pulls a private package you can’t read, a clean result says nothing about that package.

Asking your AI to check it. Those two files were written for your AI. A coding agent runs tools in a loop. Keep control over what runs with a person, including for AI agents at work.

A coding assessment malware checklist: recruiter, repo, VM

1. Verify the person. Find the company yourself, not through the recruiter’s links. Ask there if the role and the recruiter are real. The FBI says to use “separate unconnected communication platforms”.
2. Look for the company elsewhere. Funding news, press, employees, a product that works. Aydın’s test: does it exist outside its own website?
3. Check the dates. Open https://api.github.com/orgs/COMPANY in a browser, with the GitHub name in place of COMPANY. Read created_at. Compare it with the commit dates. An older date doesn’t clear anyone.
4. Ask for another way. Ask to do the test on a device they provide. The FBI names that option. Never use a work laptop.
5. Read before you run. Open the folder in VS Code Restricted Mode, and don’t trust it when asked. That disables agents and blocks the terminal by default. It can’t stop a malicious extension. Then read .npmrc, AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md and the config files.
6. If it has to run, use a throwaway VM. No real credentials, no SSH keys, no signed-in accounts, no shared folders. That limits what the code can reach. It’s no guarantee.

If you already ran it

The October 7 record is blunt. Treat the computer as “fully compromised”. Change every secret and key from a different computer. Removing the package may not remove what it left behind.

Aydın recommends rebuilding the machine. If it’s a work laptop, tell your security team before rebuilding.

For anyone job hunting

Cyber awareness is a basic skill now. For everyone, and especially for anyone job hunting.

Don’t run any repo you don’t understand from someone you don’t trust. And don’t let your AI run it for you either.

Stay safe!